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Introduction
When the Progressive Conservative party under the leadership of John
Diefenbaker won the 1957 Canadian general election, it marked a sea
change in the Canadian political landscape. Prior to the election, the
Liberal party served as the “governing party” for 22 years, first under
Mackenzie King, Canada’s longest serving prime minister and then under
his successor Louis St-Laurent. By 1957 the Liberal era had run its
course. King was dead, St-Laurent was old, the war was over and many
of the usual cast of characters who had played leading roles in Cana-
dian federal politics were either dead, old or had concluded their wars.
Canadians, too, had grown tired of the Liberals and wanted change. The
steadiness and calm that typified St-Laurent’s ministry, by the end, had
withered in a series of political scandals and boredom; the voters chose
to give the alternative a chance by voting in the Progressive Conserva-
tive minority government in 1957. Nine months later the minority gov-
ernment was terminated by the decisive 1958 election in which the Tories
secured the largest majority in Canadian political history. Diefenbaker
was thrilled. As a small-town Saskatchewan lawyer, his previous attempts
at electoral politics had been largely unsuccessful. When he was selected
leader of the hapless Progressive Conservative party in 1956, few
expected him to succeed let alone resoundingly defeat the Liberal
juggernaut.
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The Progressive Conservative party was elected to government on
June 10, 1957; Diefenbaker had won the battle but he was poised to
lose a war. When it came time to appoint his cabinet, Diefenbaker faced
the unprecedented task of having to select his ministers from a large
pool of freshly elected members of parliament ~MPs! who not only had
limited parliamentary experience but, more importantly, had no minis-
terial experience whatsoever. The situation was dire enough that Dief-
enbaker appointed himself as the minister of foreign affairs and the
president of the Privy Council and he had not filled key portfolios sev-
eral months after the Governor General swore in his first cabinet. Two
months after the general election, Canada’s national newspaper, The Globe
and Mail, speculated on its front page that “Mr. Diefenbaker is still hold-
ing open the health and welfare portfolio and three cabinet ministers—
himself, Mr. Fulton and Mr. Harkness filling two posts each—is bound
to bring renewal of the Liberal claims that the Conservatives can’t find
men to fill the positions” ~Davey, 1957: 2!.
Prime Minister Joe Clark faced a similar situation in 1979 when the
Progressive Conservatives formed a minority government. His party had
been out of power since the Progressive Conservatives’ defeat in the 1963
election. Of the 136 government party MPs elected to the 31st parlia-
ment, only five of them had served as cabinet ministers under Diefenbaker.
The Clark ministry’s short duration1 did not help his successor, Brian
Mulroney, when it came time to select his cabinet after he led the Pro-
gressive Conservative party to a landslide victory in 1984. While it is
true that 22 of the 38 ministers appointed to the first Mulroney cabinet
possessed ministerial experience, the total amount of ministerial experi-
ence for every one of those ministers was capped at 272 days, the dura-
tion of the Clark ministry. Of those 272 days, Parliament only sat for 66
of them before its dissolution.
Finally, the Conservative party of Canada’s 2006 election victory after
13 consecutive years of Liberal government left Prime Minister-elect Ste-
phen Harper with a pool of potential ministers with no cabinet experi-
ence whatsoever; indeed, only a few of the newly elected government
party MPs possessed governing party experience.
These prime ministers’ predicaments raise an interesting question
for students of ministerial career paths. By what criteria do prime min-
isters choose their ministers when the potential ministers have little polit-
ical let alone ministerial experience on which to evaluate their potential
success as a minister? Existing research ~Kerby, 2009! highlights the sig-
nificance of previous political experience when appointing ministers but
no one has yet to explore this particular aspect of the appointment pro-
cess. By addressing this question, we continue to expand our knowledge
of how prime ministers select their cabinet ministers in the Canadian and,
by extension, comparative contexts.
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This article examines the effects of expected ministerial duration on
the chances that a potential minister will be appointed to cabinet. Put
more specifically, the predicted survival rates ~derived from the dura-
tions of previous cabinet ministers! for potential, but not yet appointed
cabinet ministers, are used as an indicator of prime ministerial “guess-
ing” when the prime minister has little or no information on which to
base his decision as to which ministers to appoint to cabinet. The appoint-
ment periods which immediately follow the 1957, 1979, 1984 and 2006
Canadian federal elections are used as cases to explore this process as
they are all examples of instances where a governing party was elected
to office but possessed elected MPs with no or extremely limited previ-
ous cabinet experience. The results of the analysis demonstrate that pre-
dicted ministerial survival is positively related to ministerial appointment
to the first cabinets of the 23rd ~Diefenbaker!, 31st ~Clark!, 33rd ~Mul-
roney! and 39th ~Harper! parliaments.
This research adds to the current work on the systematic study of
elite political career paths which began in the 1990s ~Dowding and Kang,
1998; Page, 1990; Woodhouse, 1994! and has more recently resulted in a
collected research volume on ministerial appointments and resignations
in Europe ~Dowding and Dumont, 2009!. Additional research in this field
has made theoretical and methodological forays into the relationship
between ministerial careers and party discipline ~Kam and Indridason,
Abstract. The Canadian federal cabinet stands out among Westminster parliamentary democ-
racies because of the large number of first-time ministers who are appointed to cabinet without
any previous parliamentary or political experience. Several explanations have been put forward
to account for this peculiarity but no attempt has been made to examine how Canadian prime
ministers overcome the information deficit associated with appointing ministers with no expe-
rience. How can prime ministers be confident that they are making the right choice? This paper
explores the subject by estimating the survival functions of ministerial turnover for potential,
but not yet appointed, cabinet ministers were they to survive to a defined political benchmark;
these survival rates are included in a logit model of Canadian ministerial appointment follow-
ing four general elections ~1957, 1979, 1984 and 2006! in which the prime minister was tasked
with appointing a cabinet with ministerial neophytes.
Résumé. Le Conseil des ministres fédéral du Canada se démarque dans l’ensemble des
démocraties parlementaires britanniques en raison du grand nombre de ministres novices qui
sont nommés au Conseil alors qu’ils ne possèdent aucune expérience parlementaire ou poli-
tique antérieure. Plusieurs explications de cette anomalie ont été proposées, mais aucune
démarche d’analyse ne s’est encore penchée sur la manière dont les premiers ministres du Ca-
nada arrivent à surmonter le manque d’information associé à la nomination de ministres sans
expérience. Comment les premiers ministres peuvent-ils être certains d’avoir fait le bon choix?
Cette étude scrute le sujet en évaluant le coefficient de survie, en cas de remaniement ministé-
riel, pour les ministres du Conseil potentiels, mais pas encore mandatés, advenant que ces derni-
ers survivent à certains jalons politiques précis. Ces taux de survie font partie intégrante d’un
modèle de répartition des nominations ministérielles qui sont survenues à la suite de quatre
élections générales ~1957, 1979, 1984 et 2006! où le premier ministre a dû constituer un Con-
seil des ministres composé de néophytes.
2005!, public opinion ~Dewan and Dowding, 2005! and government sta-
bility ~Dewan and Myatt, 2010; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2004!.
While the research conducted on ministerial careers has been impres-
sive in recent years, both in terms of scope and number, one trend worth
noting is that the majority of the published works tend to focus primar-
ily on the subject of ministerial duration and exit. Conversely, the dis-
cussions which address ministerial appointment remain less numerous
both among and within the existing literature. This trend suggests that
ministerial resignations are a more attractive research topic than appoint-
ments! Yet appointments and resignations are effectively two sides of
the same coin; what is currently missing from the literature is an effort
to build models for comparative ministerial appointments akin to that
research which has been conducted for ministerial duration and turnover.
The article is organized as follows. First, I briefly summarize a cur-
rent model of ministerial careers and duration and review the ministerial
appointment literature in Canada. Second, I present four event history
models of Canadian ministerial duration for the periods 1867–1957, 1867–
1979, 1867–1984 and 1867–2006. The unique contribution of this article
entails using the coefficients generated by these models to estimate the
predicted survival rates of every potential cabinet minister in the first
Diefenbaker, Mulroney, Clark and Harper governments. The predicted
survival functions which fall on the median duration of all preceding cab-
inet ministers are then employed in a univariate logistic regression of
ministerial appointment. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion
of the implications of the model and some suggestions for future research
in this field of study.
Review
In general
Berlinski and colleagues offer a basic theoretical design for the study of
ministerial careers. Central to this design is the concept of ministerial
duration. They write,
Where a minister is shuffled out @of cabinet# he is seen to have served his
time, perhaps honourably and well, but nevertheless to be replaced by some-
body the prime minister believes will do a better job. Thus length of tenure
must be some indicator of performance. Of course, ministers get chosen for
all sorts of reasons ... but whatever the reason they are chosen, they will only
progress and remain as ministers if they perform well. Of course, “perform
well” can mean many things... But whatever their achievements and failings,
length of tenure gives some indication of ministerial success and is thus an
important variable to analyze. ~2007: 246!
598 MATTHEW KERBY
Ministerial duration therefore may be understood as an indicator of min-
isterial success: successful ministers, generally speaking, are those min-
isters who “survive” in cabinet. Once ministerial duration has been
established as a variable of interest, other individual and institutional
level characteristics can be introduced to the model to ascertain their
positive or negative effects on duration. Indeed, this is the approach that
Berlinski and colleagues employ to examine British ministerial tenure;
others in the comparative literature have adopted this approach as well.
With respect to ministerial hiring, Berlinski and colleagues, in sub-
sequent contributions ~2009, 2010! present the ministerial appointment
process as a principal agent problem in which prime ministers must decide
how much authority they are willing to delegate to their ministers. They
argue that the level of delegation will depend on a host of individual,
political and constitutional factors. Nevertheless, once the balance between
the variables has been struck, one imagines that this particular cabinet is
one which possesses the optimal level of survivability and by extension
performance. Put another way, the jigsaw puzzle of cabinet construction
may be solved by looking for pieces that ensure and promote the dura-
tion of cabinet ministers, and by extension the cabinet.
In Canada
The literature on Canadian ministerial appointments has been reviewed
elsewhere and it need not be restated in full here ~Kerby, 2009; White,
1998!. Briefly, cabinet seats are prized objects for MPs; a cabinet seat
may be a necessity required for obtaining political goals whether they be
realized as policy, office or votes ~Docherty, 1997, 95–96!. The uniquely
Canadian aspect of the ministerial appointment process relates to prime
ministers. It is true that Canadian prime ministers possess the exclusive
authority to appoint cabinet ministers. But they also experience the par-
adox of presiding over the most powerful political office in the state while
they are institutionally constrained by constitutional tradition and politi-
cal necessity, which demand minimal yet unspecified levels of geo-
graphic, linguistic, gender and minority representation in the cabinet
~Heard, 1991, 49–50!. Prime ministers are further constrained by the high
levels of legislator turnover which produce a selection pool of potential
ministers who are inexperienced at both the parliamentary and cabinet
levels ~Kerby and Blidook, 2011; Dewan and Myatt, 2010; Matland and
Studlar, 2004; Sutherland, 1991!.
The Prime Minister’s Dilemma
In order to imagine how Diefenbaker, Mulroney, Clark and Harper
resolved the problem of not knowing whom to appoint to cabinet, this
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study develops an indicator to replicate the guessing process: the pre-
dicted survival function for individual potential ministers in each gov-
ernment party at the beginning of their governmental tenure. To be sure,
the prime ministers examined here were not and are not the sort of empir-
ical political scientists who work out predicted survival rates for each
of their ministers, but they were, and are, shrewd politicians and they
must have conducted some kind of mental calculation in the absence of
performance indicators to ascertain which MPs would make good min-
isters.2 And, if “good ministers” are ministers who survive, then expected
survivability might be just the consideration that they had in mind. There-
fore, the main hypothesis tested in this paper is that government party
MPs who possess predicted future survival rates of .5 or greater at the
median duration point of all previous Canadian cabinet ministers should
be the first ministers appointed into a new ministry. The assumptions
behind the hypothesis are straightforward. In the absence of previous
experience to guide them, prime ministers will theoretically examine each
potential minister in their parliamentary party and compare them to an
ideal average minister whose characteristics and circumstances are made
up of all previous cabinet ministers who have served since Confedera-
tion. Any minister whose expected performance, measured as surviving
beyond the historical median of minister duration, should be looked upon
as a favourable addition to the cabinet, all other things being equal.
Data, Methods and Results
Two core datasets inform this analysis. The first consists of the popula-
tion of Canadian ministerial careers for those ministers who served from
Confederation in 1867 until the 2006 federal election. Prime ministers,
who appoint and dismiss ministers, are not included in the model nor are
unelected senators. This leaves the dataset with 587 individuals, 195 of
whom served in cabinet on more than one occasion. Ministers who exited
the cabinet and then returned at a later date are treated as separate obser-
vations. As a result, the dataset consists of 787 ministers. Of the 787,
243 exited the cabinet for reasons other than electoral defeat, govern-
ment defeat, prime ministerial resignation or death. The data set is bro-
ken down further into four periods with one “history” for each of the
cases: 1867–1957, 1867–1979, 1867–1984, 1867–2006.
The dataset also contains a series of variables which are identified
in the Canadian and comparative literatures on ministerial career paths
and which enhance or diminish ministerial durability. These variables fall
under three general headings: individual, institutional and political–
environmental level characteristics. The individual level characteristics
consist of age ~Alderman and Cross, 1985, 1987; Atkinson and Docherty,
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1992!, gender ~Crossley, 1997; Desserud, 1997; Studlar and Moncrief,
1997!, legal background ~Porter, 1965!, Quebec MP ~Matheson, 1976!,
leadership challenger status and federal political experience ~Barrie and
Gibbins, 1989; Sutherland, 1991!.3 The institutional and political envi-
ronmental variables include minority government status ~Sutherland, 1991!
and the proportion of seats held by the governing party in a minister’s
province ~Heard, 1991; White, 2005!.
These data are then used to inform an event history model for each
of the four periods. Event history analysis is an established and popular
econometric approach commonly used by social scientists who are inter-
ested in the relationship between duration and the occurrence of an
“event.” Event history models are well-matched with temporal data due
to their ability to accommodate censored time series as well as the vio-
lation of the assumption of normally distributed errors which typically
arise when working with time-to-event data ~Box-Steffensmeier and Jones,
2004!. Event history models have been used to study a variety of politi-
cal phenomena including government duration ~King et al., 1990; Ferris
and Voia, 2009!, leadership duration ~Bienen and van de Walle, 1992!,
ministerial duration ~Berlinski et al., 2007, 2010! and ministerial appoint-
ment ~Kerby, 2009!. This article employs a particular class of event his-
tory model: a semi parametric Cox proportional hazard model. The Cox
model is adopted because its flexibility with respect to the parameteriza-
tion of the hazard function is particularly well-suited when there are no
ex-ante assumptions about the shape of the distribution of time of an
individual’s risk of experiencing a terminal event.4
Once specified, the event history model is able to relate cabinet min-
isters’ individual and political characteristics, as well as the characteris-
tics of the political environment in which they serve, to the time it takes
to exit the cabinet. Duration is recorded as the span that elapses from
cabinet appointment until cabinet exit. Ministers who die in office, are
defeated in a general election or exit the cabinet when the prime minister
ceases to be the leader of the governing party are treated as censored.
The primary statistic of interest when using event history analysis
is the hazard rate, which refers to the instantaneous probability that an
individual will experience an event at a point in time given that the indi-
vidual has “survived” up until that point in time. The hazard rate is
expressed as
h~t !  lim
Dtr 0
Pr~t T t Dt 6T t!
Dt
~1!
which is the probability that an individual will fail at time t conditional
on having survived until that time. By focusing on the hazard rate one is
able to ask, “What is the likelihood that a cabinet minister will exit the
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cabinet at any point in time since becoming a minister, given how long
he has served in cabinet, conditional on a series of covariates?” The haz-
ard rate is an important statistic for this paper as the survivor function,
which is used as a predictor of ministerial appointment, is derived from
the hazard rate of ministerial duration.
The results of the event history models are found in Table 1. These
models confirm the generally held assumptions regarding ministerial dura-
tion and exit in Canada: political experience measured as years served in
the House of Commons reduces the hazard of ministerial exit as does a
professional background in law. Additionally, the strength of the govern-
ing party in a minister’s province is negatively related to the hazard rate
of ministerial exit. The exception is the leadership challenger variable in
the 1867–1957 model which counterintuitively predicts that leadership
challengers face a higher hazard of ministerial exit than non-challengers.5
The event history models of ministerial duration are then used to
estimate the predicted survival rates for those MPs elected to the first
Diefenbaker, Clark, Mulroney and Harper government parties. This sec-
ond dataset consists of the MPs who make up the selection pool of poten-
tial ministers from which the prime ministers will choose to form their
TABLE 1
Cox Proportional Hazards Model
1867–1957 1867–1979 1867–1984 1867–2006
Age 1.053 0.874 0.901 0.807**
~0.15! ~0.10! ~0.10! ~0.07!
Age2 0.999 1.001 1.001 1.002**
~0.00! ~0.00! ~0.00! ~0.00!
Legal Background 0.229 0.507* 0.502* 0.582**
~0.17! ~0.15! ~0.14! ~0.11!
Quebec Minister 1.103 1.111 1.099 1.127
~0.24! ~0.19! ~0.19! ~0.16!
Leadership Challenger 1.882 0.955 0.912 0.715
~0.87! ~0.34! ~0.32! ~0.23!
Minority Government 1.787 1.172 1.176 1.506
~0.88! ~0.46! ~0.46! ~0.53!
Federal Experience 0.956** 0.966** 0.962** 0.961***
~0.01! ~0.01! ~0.01! ~0.01!
Govt. Seats in Province 1.016*** 1.013*** 1.013*** 1.011***
~0.00! ~0.00! ~0.00! ~0.00!
Female 0.293 0.464 0.635
~0.30! ~0.34! ~0.19!
Failures 117 171 178 243
Obs 351 490 582 787
Hazard Ratios Reported
*p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001
602 MATTHEW KERBY
cabinets. The MPs’ predicted survivor rates at the median ministerial dura-
tion are included in this second dataset and subsequently in a logit model
of ministerial appointment.
Figures 1–4 present the graphical representations of the survivor func-
tions for each case’s selection pool. The graphs are divided on the x axis
by a line which marks the median duration for all uncensored cabinet
ministers who served up until the beginning of the parliament under con-
sideration; the y axis, which records the survival function is bisected at
the .5 mark, the point at which one-half of the ministers have exited the
dataset. I propose that the quadrant of interest is the top right-hand quad-
rant which consists of those MPs who have a predicted survivor function
of .5 or greater, on or after the median duration of uncensored cabinet
ministers ~the top right quadrant appears as the right-hand figure in each
graph!. If ministerial duration is positively related to ministerial perfor-
mance, as Berlinski and colleagues suggest, then one expects prime min-
isters to select, at the very least, those ministers whose predicted cabinet
survival function falls into the upper right-hand quadrant. Indeed, the
positive correlation coefficients in Tables 2 to 5 indicate that there is a
moderate positive correlation between predicted survivor functions and
ministerial appointment in each of the cases. In the absence of MPs with
FIGURE 1
Diefenbaker Predicted Survival Curves
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FIGURE 2
Clark Predicted Survival Curves
FIGURE 3
Mulroney Predicted Survival Curves
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significant cabinet experience, it appears that Diefenbaker, Mulroney,
Clark and Harper may have hedged their bets by appointing cabinet min-
isters whose predicted ministerial durability was above average.
Table 6 presents the logit model of ministerial appointment for each
prime minister’s first cabinet and includes the predicted survival func-
tion at the median ministerial duration as the independent variable of
interest. The exponentiated coefficients ~odds ratios! are presented in order
to facilitate interpretation. Variation in the four models suggests that the
prime ministers may have different interests or priorities at heart when
FIGURE 4
Harper Predicted Survival Curves
TABLE 2
Cross-correlation Table: 1957
Variables
Appointed
Minister
Predicted
Survivor
Function
Appointed Minister 1.000
Predicted Survivor Function 0.375 1.000
~0.000!
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they appointed their first cabinets. The odds ratios for the predicted sur-
vivor function for the Progressive Conservative MPs under Diefenbaker
and Mulroney’s leadership were both negative. For each percentage point
increase in the predicted survivor function, the odds of ministerial appoint-
ment decreased by 18 percent for Diefenbaker’s ministrables and four
percent for Mulroney’s ministrables. Conversely the predicted survivor
function coefficients for the Progressive Conservatives under Clark and
the Conservatives under Harper are positive. When converted to odds
ratios we see that each percentage point increase in the predicted survi-
vor function increases an MP’s odds of cabinet appointment by 8 per
cent for Progressive Conservative MPs in 1979 and 3 per cent for Con-
servative MPs in 2006.
Negative coefficients for the predicted survivor functions in the Dief-
enbaker and Mulroney cabinets suggest that expected ministerial dura-
bility may have been less of a concern for these prime ministers. This
may make sense, particularly for Mulroney. At the time of his party’s
electoral success, Mulroney presided over a very large majority govern-
ment; he could afford to take risks with respect to cabinet appointment
without any threat that the opposition parties would bring down the gov-
ernment. Additionally, the size of the parliamentary party meant that there
was an ample supply of replacement ministers to fill the cabinet seats of
ministers who failed to impress. Mulroney was also in an unusual posi-
TABLE 3
Cross-correlation Table: 1979
Variables
Appointed
Minister
Predicted
Survivor
Function
Appointed Minister 1.000
Predicted Survivor Function 0.291 1.000
~0.000!
TABLE 4
Cross-correlation Table: 1984
Variables
Appointed
Minister
Predicted
Survivor
Function
Appointed Minister 1.000
Predicted Survivor Function 0.315 1.000
~0.000!
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tion in so far as his pool of potential ministers contained large number
of political and ministerial neophytes. He could not rely on the ministra-
bles’ previous political record of success or failure because that record
simply did not exist. Lastly, Mulroney assembled his cabinet after a pro-
longed hiatus from government ~leaving the Clark interlude aside!; he
was indebted to individuals and factions within his party, particularly Que-
bec nationalists, who either supported his leadership and expected to be
rewarded with a cabinet seat or had served the party in the dark days of
opposition bench purgatory and expected a cabinet seat regardless of their
expected survivability.
In the case of Diefenbaker, the explanation is less obvious. Diefen-
baker’s story in 1957 might have been quite similar to Mulroney’s in 1984
had the 1958 election results occurred in 1957. Then the explanations
that buttress the coefficients in the 1984 model could equally apply to
the 1957 model. But the Progressive Conservatives only secured a minor-
ity government in 1957 and we should have expected Diefenbaker to be
more cautious when appointing his ministers. Although, and like Mul-
roney, the Progressive Conservative’s long absence from government
meant that Diefenbaker had a number of party loyalists who needed to
be rewarded regardless of their suitability or expected durability. As Dief-
enbaker himself noted that he was obliged to fill his cabinet with his
political enemies ~Punnett, 1977: 56, 63!.
With respect to the Clark and Harper governments, the positive coef-
ficients for the predicted survival rate variable indicate that these prime
ministers may have been more selective when choosing their ministers.
Both prime ministers presided over minority governments in their first
terms; the need to stock their cabinets with ministers whose durability
reflected experience, discretion and competence surely trumped the need
to satisfy party loyalties and demands.
Conclusion
This study of ministerial appointments further expands our understand-
ing of parliamentary process as well as elite career paths. The research
TABLE 5
Cross-correlation Table: 2006
Variables
Appointed
Minister
Predicted
Survivor
Function
Appointed Minister 1.000
Predicted Survivor Function 0.333 1.000
~0.000!
Combining Hazards: Ministerial Appointment and Exit 607
TA
B
L
E
6
L
og
is
ti
c
M
od
el
s
19
57
19
79
19
84
20
06
P
re
di
ct
ed
S
ur
vi
vo
r
F
un
ct
io
n
0.
82
1.
08
0.
96
1.
03
@0
.5
8,
1.
16
#
@0
.7
8,
1.
51
#
@0
.6
6,
1.
40
#
@0
.8
1,
1.
31
#
A
ge
1.
58
1.
04
2.
38
0.
96
@0
.6
8,
3.
65
#
@0
.1
8,
5.
83
#
@0
.5
7,
9.
87
#
@0
.1
7,
5.
40
#
A
ge
2
1.
00
1.
00
0.
99
1.
00
@0
.9
9,
1.
00
#
@0
.9
8,
1.
01
#
@0
.9
8,
1.
00
#
@0
.9
8,
1.
02
#
Fe
m
al
e
9.
51
0.
58
12
.3
2.
27
@0
.1
8,
49
7.
1#
@0
.0
00
01
8,
19
16
1.
2#
@0
.0
01
1,
13
83
30
.9
#
@0
.0
47
,1
10
.9
#
L
aw
ye
r
81
91
.6
0.
70
3.
53
3.
53
@0
.0
13
,5
.1
73
07
e
09
#
@0
.0
01
0,
49
1.
2#
@0
.0
01
7,
74
62
.1
#
@0
.0
33
,3
79
.9
#
Q
ue
be
c
M
P
0.
46
2.
17
1.
89
@0
.0
20
,1
0.
5#
@0
.2
9,
16
.2
#
@0
.1
7,
21
.6
#
Fe
de
ra
l
E
xp
er
ie
nc
e
~d
ay
s!
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
@1
.0
0,
1.
00
#
@1
.0
0,
1.
00
#
@1
.0
0,
1.
00
#
@1
.0
0,
1.
00
#
P
ro
po
rt
io
n
of
G
ov
t.
P
ar
ty
S
ea
ts
in
P
ro
vi
nc
e
0.
87
*
1.
01
0.
95
0.
99
@0
.7
3,
1.
04
#
@0
.8
8,
1.
15
#
@0
.8
1,
1.
12
#
@0
.9
1,
1.
08
#
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
11
1
13
3
21
0
12
3
L
og
li
k.

36
.7

51
.4

74
.9

49
.3
E
xp
on
en
ti
at
ed
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
;
99
%
co
nf
id
en
ce
in
te
rv
al
s
in
br
ac
ke
ts
*p
,
0.
05
,
p
,
0.
01
,
p
,
0.
00
1
608 MATTHEW KERBY
introduced in this paper takes a step towards a deeper examination of
ministerial appointments for a single case, Canada, particularly with
respect to those incidents where prime ministers are faced with the task
of forming a cabinet which is made up of ministerial neophytes.
The results of the logit models are encouraging in so far as they
both confirm and challenge the main hypothesis. True, the Canadian prime
ministers examined in this study appoint ministers who possess the his-
torical qualities associated with ministerial durability. As the Mulroney
but not necessarily the Diefenbaker cases demonstrate, however, the extent
to which prime ministers whose parties command large parliamentary
majorities are constrained by expected duration is limited. These prime
ministers, by virtue of their majorities, can afford to buck the trend!
If cabinet survival is related to ministerial success then one might
argue that MPs who are appointed to cabinet are those who are most
expected to succeed as cabinet ministers. Of course, the theoretical goal
of an immortal cabinet is hardly a desirable state of affairs in a political
system based on responsible government and the twin pillars of collec-
tive and ministerial responsibility. The absence of periodic movement in
and out of the cabinet, should the circumstances and opposition parties
demand it, may be indicative of a government that is unresponsive to
Parliament. Fortunately, this is not the case; cabinet promotion and demo-
tion is reasonably frequent.
If the model results appear somewhat deterministic, it is worth
remembering that the correlation coefficient for cabinet appointment
and predicted survivability was only moderately positive, which sug-
gests that other factors are likely at play. These factors may include prime
ministerial miscalculation as well as the influence of unique Canadian
constitutional conventions that stipulate that underrepresented groups
“should” be appointed to cabinet, even if their predicted survivability is
low. Also, prime ministers will occasionally appoint duds, risky bets or
political hopefuls in order to satisfy party demands or simply as a con-
sequence of poor judgment.
Furthermore, it is also worth remembering that the political reality
of day-to-day politics, the unanticipated surprises and exogenous shocks
can upend even the most durable of ministers, let alone those ministers
with limited political experience. Just because a minister is expected to
survive does not mean that they will survive. Both Diefenbaker and Mul-
roney presided over cabinets which could hardly be described as bullet-
proof. Stephen Harper’s dismissal of Rona Ambrose, Maxime Bernier
and Helena Guergis suggest that even underrepresentativeness in the gov-
ernment ranks will not save a minister whose time is up due to political
scandal or poor portfolio management.
At this early stage of the research process, it is necessarily to high-
light the next steps which require attention. I highly suspect that the event
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history model which is used to estimate the predicted survival rates needs
to be better specified. There are undoubtedly missing variables which
should be included: religious background, regional ministers, important
portfolios, previous ministerial experience, all come to mind. Addition-
ally, Huber and Martinez-Gallardo’s ~2008! recent foray into the realm
of competing risk event history models suggests different forms of min-
isterial exit should be considered when estimating the predicted survival
functions. Whether a minister jumps or is pushed from cabinet likely has
a different effect on the estimation of the predicted survival function.
Relatedly, a multinomial logistic model may be employed in the future
to estimate the odds of appointment to a particular cabinet rank or indi-
vidual portfolio.
The possibility of an opposition party coalition sparked by the Con-
servative government’s prorogation of parliament in 2008 raises another
opportunity for further research: how would the leader of a hypothetical
Canadian coalition government select their ministers? Formal govern-
ment formation models may help to determine the size of such govern-
ments as well as the parties that are likely to be included and the portfolios
assigned to each party, but these models do not make predictions as to
the specific individuals appointed to cabinet ~Laver and Schofield, 1998;
Laver and Shepsle, 1996!. An updated version of the model presented in
this article, one which includes the potential cabinet ministers drawn from
the likely coalition partners may be appropriate should the opportunity
for coalition government present itself again in the future.
Consideration of these additional factors will only help to provide
clearer insights into the process of ministerial appointment and prime
ministerial decision making in Canada and elsewhere.
Notes
1 The 31st parliament was capped at 66 days; it was cut short by the government’s
failure to pass its first budget; the Liberals returned to power in the ensuing general
election.
2 Brian Mulroney and Erik Nielsen created score cards which were used to record and
assess ministerial qualities among the 1984 ministrables ~Nielsen, 1989!.
3 Gender is not included as no women were appointed to cabinet during the 1867–
1957 period.
4 A shared frailty specification is also employed to account for group specific effects
which may otherwise lead to misspecified estimates of duration dependence ~Hou-
gaard, 2000; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008!.
5 The positive coefficient may be explained by the fact that official leadership conven-
tions were not held until 1921 for the Liberal party and 1927 for the Conservative
party ~predecessor of the Progressive Conservative party!. Prior to the introduction
of leadership conventions party leaders were selected by the parliamentary party and
a consensus was typically established on who would best serve as the party leader.
Prior to 1921–1927 leadership challengers were identified as those individuals who
were known leadership potentials as identified in the Canadian Historical Biography.
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Alternatively, the leadership challenger results for the 1867–1957 model may be
explained by Kam and Indridason’s finding which suggest that prime ministers use
cabinet reshuffles to fend off challengers to their leadership ~Kam and Indridason,
2005; Indridason and Kam, 2008!.
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